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IN THE COURT OF COMOM PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

ALAN J. DAVIS, Special Administrator
of the Estate of
SAMUEL H. SHEPP ARD·,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE STATE OF OHIO,

Judge Ronald Suster
Case No. 312322

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO EXCLUDE
TESTIMONY FROM 1954
TRIAL

Defendant.

Defendant, State of Ohio, through and by counsel, William D. Mason,
Prosecuting Attorney, Cuyahoga County, Assistant Prosecutor A Steven Dever, and
Assistant Prosecutor Marilyn Barkley Cassidy, requests that this court deny Plaintiff's
Motion To Exclude Testimony From 1954 Trial. The reasons for denying the motion are
set forth fully in the attached brief, which is incorporated by reference.

Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting
Attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

Bl

arilyn
ley Cassidy (00146 )
A. Stevert- ever(0024982)
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office
1200 Ontario St.
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-5870
Attorneys for Defendant

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

I. INTRODUCTION

The State of Ohio intends to introduce the testimony of witnesses who are
unavailable due to death or otherwise through their former testimony given in the 1954
criminal trial of Sam Sheppard. Pursuant to Evid.R. 804(B)(l), former testimony is not
inadmissible hearsay and plaintiff does not challenge the relevance of the prior testimony.
Nonetheless, plaintiff seeks to exclude the former testimony by relying on exclusionary
rules inapplicable to civil jurisprudence generally and particularly inapplicable to the
instant case.

-

11. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE OF GILBERT v.
CALIFORNIA (1967), 388 U.S .. 263, 87 S. CT. 1954, IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THE INST ANT CASE.

Plaintiff rests his argument on the proposition that the Supreme Court's
decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), 384 U.S. 333,86 S.Ct. 1507, subjects all the
evidence from the 1954 trial to the exclusionary rule applied in Gilbert v. California
(1967), 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951.

This is a grave mischaracterization of the

applicability of Gilbert.
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that a post-indictment pretrial lineup
in which the accused is exhibited to an identifying witness is a critical stage of the
criminal process and therefore requires that the defendant be afforded his/her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at the post-indictment lineup. The Gilbert court held that it

-

was error to allow introduction at a criminal trial of evidence of the identification of the
defendant which occurred at a pre-trial line-up because the line-up violated the
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-

defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. That is, the identification evidence was
illegally obtained. As such, the evidence was inadmissible in a trial aimed at convicting
the defendant whose rights had been violated.
In the instant case, the challenged evidence (sworn testimony from the
1954 trial) is not being used to criminally convict anyone. It was not illegally obtained.
Plaintiff has not cited any case (because none exists) applying the Gilbert rule to a civil
trial to prohibit the introduction of evidence by a civil defendant during the trial of a civil
lawsuit.
Moreover, the evidence excluded in Gilbert was constitutionally flawed
because it was illegally obtained. In the instant case, the testimony from the 1954 trial
was not constitutionally flawed and plaintiff's reliance on Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966),

-

384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, is misplaced.
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Court determined that the trial court failed to
protect Sheppard from the environment in which the 1954 trial occurred.

The

problematic environment was "the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that
attended his prosecution." Id. at 335, 86 S.Ct. at 1508. Nowhere in Sheppard v. Maxwell
is the quality of the testimony criticized must less ruled constitutionally flawed as
required for application of the Gilbert exclusionary rule.
The gravamen of the Sheppard v. Maxwell ruling was that the jury was
not shielded from the bombardment of outside influences and the onslaught of
information received other than in open court, i.e., media reporting . The quality of the
courtroom testimony was not the problem. The exclusionary rule of Gilbert v. California
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-

does not prohibit admission at the trial of the instant case of otherwise admissible prior
testimony from the 1954 trial.

III. THE "FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE"
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE.

Plaintiff next argues that the testimony of the 1954 trial is subject to the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine as solidified in Wong Sun v. U.S. (1963), 371 U.S.
471, 83 S.Ct. 407. Once again, Plaintiff has mischaracterized the holding of the Supreme
Court precedent he cites.
In Wong Sun, the defendant's statements made while under arrest and
evidence discovered therefrom were held to be inadmissible because the statements were

-

made during the course of an arrest which violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights.
Simply stated, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine applies to protect
a criminal defendant from conviction based upon secondary/derivative evidence that is
obtained in a seemingly lawful manner, but which was actually discovered only through a
violation of the criminal defendant's constitutional rights.
The 1954 trial testimony at issue was not discovered through any illegal
activity, it was simply presented at a trial that was deemed not to be "fair" because the
jury was not sufficiently shielded from extra-judicial information. The substance of the
1954 trial testimony did not flow from an illegal search/seizure or other unlawful
conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, did not suppress the
testimony, it simply allowed for a retrial.

4

CONCLUSION

Relevant testimony from the 1954 trial is admissible if the declarant is
unavailable within the meaning of Evid.R. 804.

This Court should reject plaintiff's

attempt to inappropriately apply rules of exclusion applicable only for the protection of
criminal defendants in criminal trials to block the admission of competent testimony in
this civil action. Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Testimony From the 1954 Trial should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting
Attorney of Cuyahoga County

Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-5870
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The foregoing Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Exclude Testimony From 1954 Trial was served upon plaintiff's counsel Terry Gilbert
at 1370 Ontario Street, 17 111 Floor, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, thistl day of January,
2000, by ordinary U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.

a ilyn Barkley Cassidy 001464 7)
Assistant Prosecuting At orney
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